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This question could not have got any attention a few years ago. During 
the fi rst decade of membership in the European Union (EU) all experts or 
serious politicians, let alone the larger communities of the V-4 countries, 
considered accession in 2004 as a qualitative cornerstone in their histori-
cal development from security, geopolitical, political, economic and social 
point of view alike. All of them were aware of and repeatedly emphasized 
the unambiguous advantages of having joined the EU based on various 
cost-benefi t analyses.
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At present, however, some developments in the V-4 countries, particu-
larly in Hungary (earlier) and in Poland (more recently), less in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia (both of them, and especially the fi rst one, not 
immune to anti-EU trends) seem to justifi y this question and require rea-
sonable answers in order to stop the dangerous and self-defeating populist 
wave. This paper aims at contributing to the expert debate expecting that 
a comprehensive and objective discussion can be started not only with 
populist politicians but, fi rst of all, with broader circles of the population 
in all V-4 countries.
1. Why did the question of non-membership (re)emerge?
First, political changes in the last years leading to the establishment 
of authoritarian systems (in prime minister Viktor Orbán’s expression 
‘illiberal democracy’), the special interpretation of the ‘rule of law’, the 
demolishment of basic democratic institutions became a basic challenge 
to European values cemented in EU treaties and signed by all V-4 coun-
tries in 2002 when offi cial negotiations were fi nished and the way became 
open to membership in 2004. Strong national(istic) efforts started to put 
into question the right (and obligation) of Brussels in ‘intervening’ into 
‘domestic affairs’ of the member countries.
Second, and as an unprecedented development within the EU, one of 
the member countries, namely the Hungarian government, blamed and 
accused Brussels openly and on the highest political level. Anti-EU or EU-
sceptical movements can be found in (almost) all EUmember countries, 
however anti-EU propaganda did not appear on the agenda of any govern-
ment of a member country. The poster campaign of ‘Let’s stop Brussels’ 
in Hungary was, at least until today, the most manifest example.
Third, the migration plan with obligatory resettlement of a very mod-
est number of asylum seekers (not ‘migrants’!) fostered the V-4 cohesion 
and confronted the priority of ‘national identity’ (‘we are not an immi-
grant country’) with the EU’s migration plan. Although the Hungarian 
and Slovak appeal has been rejected by the European Court of Justice, 
this confrontation did not fi nish. Just the opposite, it seems to be the most 
important element of demonstrating the (never existed) strong cohesion 
among the V-4 countries.
Fourth, Brexit and its potential consequences fundamentally weakened 
the position of the V-4 within the EU. Great Britain had always been con-
sidered by V-4 politicians as the basic ally against any deepening of the in-
tegration. With the potential Brexit, V-4 countries not only are losing their 
strategic ally but, at the same time, may be facing the revival of the deepen-
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ing process of crisis in the EU and the emerging institutional dividing lines 
between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’. It raises a huge dilemma for all anti-
EU politicians. Nobody would like to end up at the (institutional) periphery 
of the integration because everybody is concerned with the potential geo-
political and socio-economic consequences. Therefore, obvious steps have 
to be made to avoid such a situation, which means that V-4 countries have 
to accept the rules, conditions and consequences of deepening divisions in 
various areas of the integration. This, however, contrasts with populist anti-
EU policies at home, because, at a given moment, such a domestic socio-po-
litical environment could easily lead to ‘self-peripherization’. The ‘peacock 
dance’ (to use V. Orbán’s expression) consisting of accepting practically all 
EU-level decisions in Brussels and at the same time continuing with anti-
EU rhetoric at home has to be stopped in order to avoid a self-generating 
process of ‘self-peripherization’.
Fifth, V-4 countries, belonging to the main benefi ciaries of EU cohe-
sion fund are fully aware of the fact that the unprecedented moderniza-
tion chance fi nanced over two budgetary periods (2007–2013 and 2014–
2020) is unlikely to be prolonged after 2020. The new multiannual budget 
(2021–2027), with offi cial negotiations just starting, will look rather dif-
ferent from the previous ones. First, due to the consequences of Brexit, 
the EU cannot any more rely on payments coming from the second larg-
est contributor. The alternatives are looking for additional contributions 
by the remaining members or seriously cutting the next budget. Second, 
the changing priorities of the EU (more resources for future-oriented ac-
tivities instead of fostering the ‘status-quo’ mentality and behaviour), are 
expected to substantially modify the structure of expenditures. Third, 
even if cohesion funds were to remain and were not be seriously reduced, 
the conditions of getting resources will be changed (from one-sided fl ow 
of money towards long-term and repayable credits).
Sixth, emerging self-deceiving arguments by V-4 politicians, as part 
of demonstrating the ‘independence’ and ‘maturity’ of the four countries 
both in alliance and individually have to be professionally criticized. 
Most recently, the Hungarian prime minister announced, that Hungary 
does not need any more EU money, because it stands on its feet and can 
generate high growth rates without EU support. Polish politicians em-
phasize that EU funds, to a large extent, served and enriched the net con-
tributer countries, fi rst of all Germany, and not Poland. The Czech scene 
is more modest, since the key argument is more national manouevring 
room and less ‘interference’ (or ‘dominance’) by Brussels. Also, the V-4 
level argument according to which it is this group that may become the 
driver of EU growth and a key player in preparing the integration for the 
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challenges of the 21st century and in exerting manifestly growing (or even 
decisive) infl uencing on shaping the future of the EU has to be mentioned 
and righly addressed (for specifi c comments see Chapter 3).
2. Membership vs. non-membership: some basic facts
It would be an ahistorical approach to imagine what would have hap-
pened with the V-4 region and the individual countries if they had not en-
tered the EU. However, as an intellectual exercise, we could develop some 
scenarios concerning geopolitical security, domestic political stability, 
the development and sustainability of the democratic system that started 
to unfold after the systemic change in 1990. In addition, economic is-
sues, such as growth, structural change and competitiveness, behaviour of 
foreign investors, unemployment, foreign trade and the availability (and 
costs) of external fi nancial resources could extensively be dealt with in the 
framework of costs and benefi ts of ‘economic independence’ in a period 
of unprecedented globalization. Finally, the imaginary discussion should 
not ignore the potential impacts on ‘social modernization’.
However, instead of yielding to the seduction of imagining never hap-
pened scenarios, this paper focuses on the current, rather complicated 
reality. The real issue is how did more than one decade of full-fl edged 
EU membership shape the V-4 countries in general, and their relations 
with(in) the EU.
Before an economic analysis, two basic pillars have to be underlined. 
First, all acceding countries have committed themselves to the EU rules, 
including the primacy/supremacy of EU law over national legislation in 
all areas where EU law prevails. Moreover, they accepted the ‘no opt-out’ 
principle, according to which, they have to join all EU policies in the fu-
ture, even if transitional periods, both in the interest of the EU and of the 
joining member countries, can or have to be admitted (Eurozone, Schen-
gen, etc.). Second, the V-4 countries have clearly defi ned their interests 
in membership, including the four freedoms (trade, services, capital and 
with special emphasis on citizens and manpower), just access to EU funds 
and full-fl edged participation in EU institutions and decision-making 
bodies. In all areas, membership guaranteed these requirements. It is re-
grettable, that, from the very beginning of accession, the political leader-
ship in each country stressed the importance of free fl ow of labour and 
access to EU money and ignored the unique opportunity to have become 
member of an international organization in which small countries, based 
on shared sovereignty, could have a much greater impact than in case of 
insisting on ‘national sovereignty’.
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2.1. Impact on overall growth
V-4 growth over the entire period (2004–2016) was substantially higher 
than that of the EU-28 (and even more than that of the EU-15). Although 
the 2008–2009 crisis interrupted this process, most countries recovered 
quite soon, being Hungary the exception. In 2009, EU-28 growth suffered 
a decline of 4.3 per cent, but Poland remained the only EU member coun-
try with positive growth (1.6 per cent), while the Czech and Slovak fi gures 
were slightly below the EU average (4.5 and 4.9 per cent, respectively), 
and only Hungary experienced a very strong decline (6.8 per cent). Be-
tween 2010 and 2013 average EU-28 cumulative growth (5.1 per cent, fully 
offsetting the 2009 decline) was accompanied by above average growth on 
Poland (16.2 per cent), Slovakia (12.6 per cent) and the Czech Republic 
(7.5 per cent), being Hungary the only one not yet fully absorbing the 
consequences of the crisis (4.0 per cent). 
Prospects for the period of 2017–2018 indicate that an EU-28 average 
growth of 3.6 per cent will be accompanied by much higher growth in all 
V-4 countries (6.6 per cent for Poland, 6.5 per cent for Slovakia, 5.1 per 
cent for Hungary and 5 per cent for the Czech Republic). These fi gures 
confi rm that EU membership substantially contributed to higher than 
average growth and, accordingly, to the successful catching-up process 
to EU average. Of course, the share of the respective growth factors con-
tributing to and explaining this outcome, such as domestic consumption, 
investments and foreign trade may be different from country to coun-
try. Unfortunately, an in-depth analysis cannot be made here due to the 
limited size as well as the key focus of this paper. It has to be added that 
domestic (partly still transformation-generated), external (trade, foreign 
direct investments and EU funds) and, more importantly, more or less 
successful combination and interaction of both factors have generated 
these fi gures.
2.2. Foreign trade developments
Foreign trade proved to be the key driver of growth, structural change 
and unprecedented and successful geographic reorientation for all V-4 
countries. In contrast to the opinion of many experts, high dependence on 
the ex-Soviet market could be changed within a few years, partly due to 
the collapse of the Soviet market and partly to the opening of EU markets, 
including fi rst large-scale investments of foreign companies with trade-
generating impacts. Defi nitely, this process, both due to its dramatic speed 
and the lack of institutional preparedness (including several intranspar-
ent privatization deals) did involve high costs and not only benefi ts. How-
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ever, all other (imagined) options would have entailed much more costs 
and much less benefi ts.
Well before membership (even at the moment of starting accession ne-
gotiations) all V-4 countries have completely changed the geographic ori-
entation and concentrated on the EU markets. In fact, almost completely 
free trade (excepting some agricultural products) was implemented sev-
eral years before accession. Between 2005 and 2015 the V-4 share in total 
EU-exports grew from 6.4 to 9.8 per cent and in EU total imports from 
6.7 to 9.6 per cent (see Table 1). More importantly, excepting Poland, the 
other three Visegrad countries belong to those EU member countries with 
very high dependence on foreign trade (about 80 to 90 per cent of export 
in GDP and about 150 to 160 per cent of ‘openness’ as expressed by ex-
ports plus imports in GDP). 
It has to be underlined that the V-4 countries, due to their historical 
heritage and their geopolitical situation, are much heavier relying on EU 
trade than most of the other member countries. On V-4 level, 83 per cent 
of their total exports was located in other EU member countries in 2005 
and almost the same share (81.7 per cent) in 2015. At the same time, the 
EU-28 average declined from 68 to 63 per cent in a decade, due to the im-
pact of the crisis that forced several countries to fi nd new markets outside 
the sluggish EU economy but also thanks to higher competitiveness in 
a globalized environment. Similar, although more moderate trends can 
be identifi ed in imports as well (not independent from rapidly falling oil 
prices). (For details see Table 2).
The very high and structurally (and geographically) determined reli-
ance on the EU had been confi rmed by the reaction of the member coun-
tries to the fi nancial and economic crisis of 2008–2009. Obviously, all 
member countries open and heavily dependent on trade had to look for 
extra-EU markets in order to mitigate the negative impact of the crisis. 
The efforts proved to be rather differentiated. Overall, the V-4 countries 
were unable to substantially reorient their exports. Despite the fact that, 
for instance Hungary, came up with a rather costly and non-performing 
‘strategy of opening towards the East’, and most recently, with a trade 
strategy towards the South (Africa and Latin America). Lacking competi-
tive commodities and market knowledge of small and medium sized do-
mestic fi rms, both initiatives were a complete and high-cost failure with 
personal benefi ts to friends of the governing party only, who were nomi-
nated heads of (non-performing) trade representations in different parts 
of the world.
In sum, foreign trade of the V-4 is strongly rooted in the intra-EU con-
text. It used to be over a longer period and, to a small extent, is still one of 
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the driving factors of growth. Its size, geographic orientation and struc-
tural modernization are to a large extent dependent on foreign (mainly 
EU) fi rms with substantial investments in manufacturing (partly also in 
the fi nancial and service sectors). The development of genuine small- and 
medium-sized companies has started but, in most cases, it did not reach 
the critical level of competitiveness, excepting some highly export-orient-
ed fi rms or successful subsidiaries of multinational companies fi rmly in-
tegrated into the international intra-fi rm supply chains. Therefore, from 
the aspect of trade, growth and also employment, membership in the EU 
is crucial for all V-4 countries.
2.3. Foreign direct investments and EU membership
Foreign capital played a decisive role in the success of transformation, 
structural change and competitiveness of the V-4 countries. In addition, 
based on their own interests, they were important drivers of EU accession. 
They started to invest in the region well before offi cial negotiations started 
in 1998 (see Hungary) or during the accession period, anticipating mem-
bership for granted. No cost-benefi t analysis can ignore that foreign com-
panies fundamentally contributed to economic growth and structural mod-
ernization, transfer of technology, education and training, employment and 
creating a new social environment. In sum, they defi nitely strengthened the 
region’s integration in global and EU-level structures. It remains a crucial 
challenge to national economic (and overall) policies how to enhance the 
value-added share of domestic production, including competitive small- 
and medium-sized companies. Among others, in the framework of a com-
prehensive strategy, available EU funds could be(or could have been) used 
for this purpose. Solid membership in the EU remains a cornerstone for 
foreign capital located in the V-4 countries, both concerning additional in-
vestments in structural upgrading of their current production and as far as 
future green-fi eld investments in the region.
2.4. Free movement of persons
This was one of the most important requirements of the new member 
states (mainly driven by Poland) to sign the accession treaties. After 2004 
three members (United Kingdom, Sweden and Ireland) immediately lift-
ed all restrictions, while other ‘old’ member countries did it within a tran-
sitional period of 7 years (being Germany and Austria the last countries 
to eliminate all barriers). The ‘migration capacity’ of the individual V-4 
countries was rather different after 2004. While we experienced a huge 
outfl ow from Poland (and partly Slovakia), Czech and Hungarian citizens 
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made rather limited use of this possibility, concentrating on highly-skilled 
areas, such as doctors (in Sweden) and computer engineers (in Ireland). 
The situation dramatically changed after 2010 in Hungary, resulting in 
an additional 500.000 citizens leaving the country in the last seven years 
(as compared to 100.000 employers or employees in other EU countries 
between 2004 and 2010). 
At the moment there are about 6 mn EU citizens working (and living) 
in another EU country, out of which about 40 to 45 per cent originate in 
the V-4, with clear dominance of Polish, and increasingly Hungarian citi-
zens. The reasons of working abroad are manifold and can by far not just 
be explained by wage differences. Overall living conditions, economic se-
curity, social and political environment, democracy, rule of law, predict-
ability of personal life and professional career are partly already more im-
portant ingredients of the decision of going to (and remaining in) another 
EU member country. 
Of course, massive (e)migration is an ambiguous development. On the 
one hand, it reduces high-level and socially unfavourable domestic un-
employment (see Poland over a longer period) and increases fi nancial re-
sources as a result of remittances sent back by citizens working abroad. 
The latter, at least for a certain time, can become an important factor of 
external fi nancial stability and, not least, of domestic stability and higher 
consumption, if it reaches poorer people left behind in the country of origin 
and automatically contributing to a fairer redistribution of income. On the 
other hand, it may deprive the sending country of the best prepared, tal-
ented, mobile and young people, increase lack of skilled labour needed by 
competitive domestic and foreign-based companies, sharpen demographic 
problems, increasing regional differentiation and depriving governments 
from a broad group of taxpayers. However, the most dangerous negative im-
pact, as we can already see today, is that ‘mental contamination campaigns’ 
of the governments, not least against the EU fi nd a fertile soil in wide seg-
ments of the population that feels loser of the changes, lives in backward 
regions and belongs to the rapidly growing elder generation. 
Still, free movement of citizens (and labour) was a precondition of 
membership. Remaining outside the EU or leaving the EU today, would 
bring back high level of unemployment, closing of many factories oper-
ated by foreign companies with additional unemployment, lack of remit-
tances and higher level and more poverty and regional backwardness. The 
returning or retained ‘brain drain’ could not compensate for the costs, 
due to lack of capital and competitive investments as well as to growing 
internal social or even political instability. In sum, such a situation would 
be much more harmful than the cost-benefi t balance of (e)migration.
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2.5. The impact of EU resources
Over the period of two multiannual fi nancial frameworks (2007–2013 
and 2014–2020) the V-4 region had access to EU funds in the amount of 
about 240 bn euros, or, on the average, 17 bn Euro annually. Of course, the 
money, even if fully used (which has not been the case), has not been dis-
tributed evenly from year to year. In some years, mainly in the fi rst period 
with projects launched, only a very modest sum could be drawn, while the 
second half of the period showed very high payments. There is no doubt, 
however, that EU resources over 14 years offered an unprecedented his-
torical opportunity for sustainable modernization, provided the money had 
been or is being spent correctly and for the right purposes. On yearly aver-
age, EU transfers corresponding to 2.5 per cent of GDP of the region (and 
about 3.5 per cent in case of Hungary) can (or should be able to) produce 
an annual growth of 2.5 per cent without any change in the domestic eco-
nomic performance – at least on paper. This calculation does not include 
successful use of EU resources for developments with multiplier effects, 
since the latter would further contribute to growth. The use (or abuse with) 
EU funds needs a comprehensive analysis in each V-4 country, not least 
because arguments for and against the construction of the next multian-
nual fi nancial framework will essentially be infl uenced by how previous 
EU resources have been used or misused. Just an example: we do not know 
what has happened with EU funds available to Hungary equal to 3.5 per 
cent economic growth (on paper). Namely, real economic growth through 
the last decade remained signifi cantly below this fi gure.
The experience of the V-4 with EU funds reinforces some arguments 
against the one-sided fl ow of money without strict EU-level control. There 
are several cases in which EU resources have strengthened uncompeti-
tive structures, fostered business and social attitudes against any change, 
created ‘fund-dependency’, and, not least, became the hotbed of large-
scale corruption. Public procurement processes ignoring clear EU rules, 
blatant (shameless) overpricing and use of the money for other purposes 
than those formulated in the contracts belong to the frequent forms of 
misuse and could be easily identifi ed and punished if an adequate control 
system functioned. Hungary is on top of the negative impacts of using EU 
funds. Not only due to the largest difference between the highest share of 
EU funds as compared to the GDP of the country, and the lowest growth 
in V-4 comparison, but mainly in the qualitative context. It is unprec-
edented in EU history that the largest part of EU resources creates and 
consolidates the economic background of a political maffi a openly hostile 
to the EU in general, and permanently neglecting or even deliberately 
undermining basic EU rules, in particular.
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In sum: EU resources have substantially contributed to the adjust-
ment and catching-up process of the V-4. However, due to several reasons, 
the real effect was much lower than the potential and expected one. In 
addition, they have generated not only positive but also negative conse-
quences, from structural rigidities, through passive attitudes to direct or 
indirect support to corruption in general, and to corrupt governments, in 
particular.
2.6. Membership in Schengen
The importance of Schengen is generally not emphasized or not even 
acknowledged. However, it has a very positive impact on member coun-
tries, not least the V-4 region. First, it can be considered as a win-win 
system for European security. On the one hand, it shifted the Eastern 
(security) border of the ‘old’ EU to the new members’ Eastern border (ex-
cepting Finland). On the other hand, belonging to Schengen (together 
with belonging to the NATO) has enhanced the security of the new mem-
ber countries which became the new Eastern (and Southern) border of 
the EU. Second, free fl ow of citizens would be massively and negatively 
affected with border controls among member countries. This would be 
a relevant barrier to keep on working in another EU member country 
(and regularly returning to the home country for short visits or longer 
term stay). Third, several transnational companies based on just-in-time-
production would not have considered the V-4 countries as favourable 
location for their investments. For instance, Audi or Mercedes, two lead-
ing German car companies (generating about 25 per cent of Hungarian 
exports) opted for investments in Győr and Kecskemét because, among 
other factors, such as direct highway connections, production costs can be 
substantially reduced by not establishing huge stocks in the factories but 
supplying continuous production by continuous daily deliveries of in-
dustrial inputs, spare parts, accessories, etc. This continuous fl ow of com-
modities in both directions (including export of cars) can only function 
if there is no border control and substantial loss of time. Non-Schengen 
would immediately disrupt this supply chain.
3. Weak anti-EU arguments of populist governments
In the concluding part let me come back to some of the most frequently 
used anti-EU arguments mentioned at the beginning of the paper.
First: Hungary cannot survive without EU support. An almost 4 per 
cent growth registered in 2017, the highest in a decade, is more or less 
equivalent to the average annual infl ow of EU money. Since for 2018 
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a higher than average infl ow of EU resources is predicted, a 4 per cent 
growth rate will even more remain fundamentally dependent on EU 
money. Since EU funds will most probably be much lower and linked to 
strict conditions after 2020, and genuine domestic sources of sustainable 
development cannot be identifi ed, mainly because they were not created 
in an unprecedentedly favourable modernization period offering a never 
returning historical window-of-opportunity, the country is far away from 
fulfi lling its offi cially proclaimed slogan of ‘living on its own feet’. Not 
saying a word about the high (inter) dependence on trade and foreign 
capital activities in Hungary.
Second: the Polish authorities’ argument, according to which EU funds 
mainly favoured foreign companies, can easily be rejected. Of course, no-
body denies that also companies of net contributing countries benefi tted 
from the EU funds obtained by Poland. However, there is a very strong 
and multiple interlinkage among benefi ciaries, both Polish and foreign 
ones. EU funds fi nancing infrastructure projects benefi tted not only for-
eign fi rms to consider location in Poland favourable but also domestic 
companies and citizens alike. In addition, foreign companies working 
in Poland create employment, contribute to the Polish budget, develop 
and implement educational, training and social programs, introduce new 
technologies, etc. In addition, interlinkages enhance economic security.
Third: the artifi cially but deliberately created common demon/devil, 
namely the threat of migration has to be correctly interpreted and pre-
sented to the already mentally contaminated societies of the region. If 
Polish politicians believe that about 6000 legally relocated asylum seekers 
(or, in the Hungarian case, 1.294 asylum seekers) would really threaten 
the ‘national identity’ of the country, then there must be a basic problem 
with this identity. Especially in the situation, when up to 10 per cent of 
the domestic labour force seeks its future outside the country. Why is this 
very unfavourable development not considered to be THE real threat to 
‘national identity’? 
Societies closed to the world will not be able to survive the challenges 
of the 21st century, small ones even less than larger ones. V-4 countries, 
in their own fundamental interest, need to change their current attitude 
against the outside world (migration is just one topic, further EU mem-
bership and its quality is another and there are many additional issues on 
the agenda). They have to start building ‘innovative societies’, the only 
guarantee of successful and sustainable development. Innovative societies 
are built on openness and not closing-down, cooperation and not hate 
campaigns, cohesion and not polarization, future-oriented approach and 
not fl ight back to ‘glorious’(?) history, acceptance of the principle and 
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practice of two-way solidarity, etc. In this context, scope and limits of ‘na-
tional sovereignty’ in the global and further globalizing environment of 
the 21st century have to be addressed and widely discussed, both in each 
of the V-4 countries and in all cross-V-4 meetings.
Fourth: It is crucial to develop a realistic view of the potential of the 
V-4 in the EU context. V-4 represents 6 per cent of the GDP of the EU-
28, much less than the Benelux group. The latter has never come up with 
leadership demand but could substantially infl uence decision-making 
processes by clever compromises, fl exibility and high level of adjustment 
capacity. Self-proclaimed leadership of the V-4 may be a political slogan 
without any content and credible implementation capacity. Of course, 
more cooperation on the regional level and a new quality of participat-
ing in the renewal of the European integration would be most welcome. 
However, in order to take on this role, anti-EU attitudes should be ur-
gently abandoned, before they will reach a critical level of hatred against 
foreignes in general, and the EU instititutions or integration efforts in 
particular, in the respective societies – with irreversible developments or, 
minimally, with extraordinary and long-term economic and social costs. 
The last decade, after V-4 countries accession to the EU, would have 
offered at least two historical chances which have not been used. First, im-
mediately after accession, and just by mere looking at the map, it became 
clear that the enlarged union needs a third North-South infrastructure 
corridor (both for rapid train and highway connections), as such a cor-
ridor had been implemented earlier between Scotland and Gibraltar and 
between Scandinavia and Sicily. Unfortunately, nobody in the V-4 group 
came up with such an idea, although the EU developed a long-term plan 
of infrastructure development. With proper cooperation such a corridor 
could and should have become part of this strategy. 
Interestingly, this idea has emerged most recently but outside the V-4. 
It is China that seems to have discovered this missing link in European 
North-South connection, linked to the strategic Belt and Road (or New 
Silk Road) project. The ownership of the Pireus port in Greece and the 
planned (and highly disputed) railway modernization between Belgrade 
and Budapest can be considered as part of a strategy, provided further 
elements of this strategy will become available in the near future. Sec-
ond, nobody would have impeded the V-4 countries to start a strategic 
cooperation in fostering their respective small- and medium sized entre-
preneurial sector and, particularly, extending such initiatives to regional, 
cross-country cooperation. Even sizeable EU resources could have been 
used for creating a competitive and strong, young and innovative regional 
entrepreneurial sector based on export-orientation, participation in the 
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global or regional value chain of transnational companies and success-
fully competing with imported goods and services in V-4 markets. 
Without strong economic fundaments, the realistic assessment of pos-
sibilities and limits of joint actions and clear and prospective (not hostile) 
views on the future of the EU, the V-4 cooperation remains strictly lim-
ited to political slogans and commonly created and manipulated enemies. 
At the same time, decisive dividing factors remain, such as the assessment 
of Russia (with huge geostrategic assymetry between the Hungarian and 
the Polish view), or the introduction of the euro (with Slovakia being 
Eurozone member, and with its clear preference to the EU and the Euro, 
in case it should choose between the EU and the V-4). In fact, in all those 
circumstances, V-4, in its current form and with its current performance, 
may be or should be more appropriately coined as ‘Vacuum-4’. That is 
a very ambitious gathering of states fi ghting separately for their own nar-
row-minded ‘national interests’, without taking into consideration wider 
perspective and long-term blueprints or scenarios. 
Open cross-country and multi-level EU-wide discussion about the 
‘costs of non-EU’ would be benefi cial for future-oriented approaches to-
wards a deepening and stronger integration in the new global environ-
ment. Also, and not less importantly, well-founded arguments should 
be used to stop and reverse the ongoing ‘mental contamination’ already 
present – and unfortunately strong and increasing – on the regional level, 
in favour of the sustainable future of the V-4 countries, but also of further 
and fruitful European integration.
Table 1. Share of the V-4 countries in total EU exports and imports 
(a) Exports (EU-28 = 100)
Countries 2005 2008 2010 2015
Poland 2.2 2.9 3.1 3.7
Czech Rep. 1.9 2.5 2.6 2.9
Slovakia 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.4
Hungary 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8
V-4 total 6.4 8.3 8.7 9.8
(b) Imports (EU-28 = 100)
Countries 2005 2008 2010 2015
Poland 2.4 3.3 3.3 3.7
Czech Rep. 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.7
Slovakia 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.4
Hungary 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8
V-4 total 6.7 8.5 8.6 9.6
Source: Eurostat and own calculations.
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Table 2. Intra-EU share of exports of and imports by the Visegrad countries 
(in per cent of total exports and imports)
(a) Intra-EU exports
Country 2005 2008 2010 2015
EU-28 68.0 67.7 65.4 63.2
Poland 79.0 78.1 79.3 79.2
Czech Rep. 86.1 85.4 84.3 83.3
Slovakia 87.9 85.7 84.8 85.4
Hungary 82.5 79.8 78.4 81.3
V-4 average 83.0 81.7 81.4 81.7
(c) Intra-EU imports
Country 2005 2008 2010 2015
EU-28 64.6 62.7 61.9 63.3
Poland 75.4 71.9 70.8 70.3
Czech Rep. 81.5 77.0 75.0 77.1
Slovakia 78.1 73.2 72.1 78.7
Hungary 70.2 68.6 68.0 76.3
V-4 average 76.2 72.7 71.6 74.6
Source: Eurostat and own calculations.
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